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A VIOLATION OF A MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE
-IS IT FISH OR FOWL?*
HON. MITCHEL B. JOHNS, Judge of the Superior Court,
City and County of Denver

And it came to pass that in the Court of General Sessions
in the City and County of Denver, on the 20th day of September
in the Year of our Lord Nineteen Hundred and Fifty-Five, there
was called up for trial before the Honorable Pontius Pilate the
case of the City and County of Denver v. John J. Lazarus.
And the Honorable Judge, clothed in the black raiments of
his office, saith unto the defendant who stood before him:
"Defendant Lazarus, thou art charged by the City of Denver
with the violation of assault, 'how answerest thee?" And the Defendant sayeth: "I answer nil debet, Your Most Worshipful Magistrate."
To which the learned Court replied: "Thou canst not answer
thus. Thou must reply 'guilty, or not guilty' as is the wont in such
cases."
And Lazarus looketh with fear into the eyes of the noble judge
and saith: "How can I answer thee thus? Is it not written in the
Book of Law, in the Case of City of Greeley v. Hamman, 12 Colo.
94, that a prosecution for the violation of a Municipal Ordinance
punishable by fine or imprisonment is not a criminal proceeding,
but a civil action in the nature of an action in debt. And has it not
been verily said that in reply to an action in debt, one who is not
so indebted answereth 'nil debet.' "
And the distinguished jurist saith unto Lazarus: "So it is
written in the Book of Law that this is a civil case, and so is it
the practice in pleadings to answer thus to an action in debt. But
the law giveth and the law taketh away. And in the book to which
thou referrest there is not permitted such a reply to the violation
of a Municipal Ordinance. Verily thou must plead to the charge,
guilty or not guilty."
And Lazarus replieth to the Court: "Thou art learned, and
thou art the Judge." And the Judge stateth: "I am the judge."
And Lazarus took unto himself two minutes for deliberation,
while the attendants of the Court waited for Lazarus and marvelled
at his audacity. And he finally spake unto the Judge on this wise:
"This most humble defendant desireth not to affront the dignity
of this esteemed Court, but inquireth of the learned Judge if the
lowly defendant be permitted to file an answer as is the custom in
all well established civil tribunals."
Whereupon the black-robed Judge answereth with finality
and saith unto Lazarus: "Thou art permitted no right to formally
answer , for it was thus decided by the worthy justices in Rinn v.
* Address given by Judge Johns before the Law Club in Denver on September 26, 1955.
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Boulder, and it is Written in Dietz v. City of Central, 1 Colo. 323,
that the subtilties of the common law action of debt do not apply
to cases of this type."
And the defendant Lazarus looketh earnestly to the Judge and
saith unto him: "Likewise, is it not practiced in the law that all
actions for violation of Municipal Ordinances are in the name of
the Municipality, and actions in crimes in the name of the People?"
And the Judge replieth unto Lazarus, saying: "Lazarus, thou
art keen in the ways of the law-so it is practiced in the procedures."
And Lazarus, kneeling, imploreth the Judge: "I am thy ignorant servant, without counsel, and with fear in the premises; how
saith thee that for breaches of the ordinances there was brought
before the Judges two cases in the name of the People, to-wit:
"People v. Braisted, 13 Colo. App. 532, and Davis v. The People,
47 Colo. 1; thou art learned and sagacious, thou art the Judge.
How sayest thee?"
And the Honorable demandeth: "I am the Judge. How pleadest thou, guilty or not guilty?"
And Lazarus, hearing the exhortation, trembled and asked
meekly of the Judge: "In the trial in these cases, how balanceth
thee the scales? Requireth thou the quantum of preponderance, or
the quantum of reasonable doubt?"
And the Jurist replieth: "It has long been established that
the rule of preponderance prevaileth."
And Lazarus regardeth the Judge with much apprehension
and saith: "My liberty thou mayest deprive, and my property thou
mayest take by a preponderance-how then, 0 Justice, doest
thou levy an execution against the body and sell at public sale? The
practice of slavery thou are forbidden. Lincoln did so speak, and
our fathers have so declared by blood."
And the Judge replieth to Lazarus, "There shall be no selling
of the body, for these are the days of enlightenment."
And Lazarus inquireth of the Judge: "How then doest thou
do satisfaction-if a fine be duly imposed and I be without fundshath the plaintiff an empty judgment as is the case in the majority
of actions civil?"
And the Judge answereth: "The Chief Justice Steele in 1909
hath declared in Davis v. People, in a prosecution for a violation
of a Municipal Ordinance, the Defendant may be fined and committed until the fine is paid."
And Lazarus exclaimeth: "Oh, Most Worshipful and Esteemed
Magistrate, thou hast stated aforetime that the action is civil and
one in debt, and now thou wouldest impound the body. Have not
our forefathers in the ages of the past forbidden imprisonment for
debt as well as the star chamber, the rack, and the screw? This
lowly and uninformed defendant has long so understood the proscriptions. Thou are learned and thou art wise. Explainest thou
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that in this modern day a man may be imprisoned for debt-O
Learned Judge ?"
And the Jurist, casting down his eyes, saith: "Yes, I am the
Judge. How answereth thee, guilty or not guilty?"
And Lazarus, gravely and with timidity, sayeth unto the noble
Court: "It is spoken in the market place among the debtors that
a plaintiff cannot have judgment without proof of damages. How
wilt the Court measure proof of damages for assault-if one striketh lightly or heavily-doest thou measure severity on the scales
of dollars and cents and in days of imprisonment? How can it be
so? And if there be the swearing in of an expert on assault, what
shall be the foundation proper for the receipt of the testimony expert? Thou art just. Thou will require proof of damages as in
action in debt, 0 worthy Justice. Thou art learned in the laws of
evidence. Thou art the Judge."
And the Honorable Justice Pilate replieth on this wise: "I
am the Judge-how sayest thee, Lazarus, guilty or not guilty?"
And Lazarus looketh from side to side and supplicateth unfo
the Judge: "I beseech thee for a jury, that I may lay before my
fellow men my guilt or my innocence."
And the Judge in compassion spake thusly: "Woe unto thee,
Lazarus, a jury thou canst not have."
And Lazarus, his eyes large with disbelief, crieth out: "Is
it not written in the great book of Constitutions that an accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury ?"
And the Honorable spake with authority: "A speedy trial thou
shall surely have, for the rule has long been provided in City of
Greeley v. Hamman, 'The public welfare demands a summary and
speedy prosecution of offenders against municipal ordinances,'
but a jury trial thou shalt not have."
And Lazarus pleadeth: "How can this be? The writing of the
Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the landthe protection of the individual liberty and life of man-the shield
against the onslaught of tyrants and despots. The sages of past
times have so recognized and so upheld. Who dareth to strike
down these inalienable rights, these guarantees so long preserved?
Who dareth ?"
And the Judge picketh up the Book of the Law and spake on
this wise unto Lazarus, saying: "Hearken unto thee-take heed
that ye be not deceived, for much has come to be said in the name
of the Book of Constitutions, but little is understood. It was written in the year 1892 by the Justice Helm in McInerney v. City of
Denver, 17 Colo. 302, on the subject of which thou speakest, and
which I now read to you:
The proposition is urged by counsel that the following offenses against municipal ordinances be prosecuted
by jury trial, viz.: The injuring or obstructing of streets
or alleys, the obstructing or polluting of sewers, the es-
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tablishing of offensive trades or manufactories, assaults,
assaults and batteries, disturbance of the peace, unlawful
assemblages, riots, routs, indecent exposures, the keeping
of gambling houses, of houses of prostitution, soliciting on
the street by prostitutes, carrying concealed weapons,
disturbances of Sunday worship, bunco and confidence
steering, the practice of fakiring devices in fraudulently
selling articles on the sidewalk, etc., etc.
It is needless to say that a judicial recognition of the
right to a trial by jury in all the local offenses above enumerated, would seriously impair the usefulness and efficiency of city governments. Whatever may be the view
concerning the gravity of the offense against a state law,
the very fact that the legislature authorizes the city to
deal with the same subject by ordinance indicates. that to
the legislative mind, the act also properly constitutes one
of those petty offenses regarded as local injuries. The
public welfare, requiring the maintenance of peace and
good order as well as of careful sanitary regulations in
cities and towns, renders summary proceedings in many
cases a necessity. And we are not now prepared to inaugurate the revolution that must follow the announcement
of the doctrine that a jury trial is an indispensable prerequisite. It is hardly necessary to say that such a trial is
not always essential to "due process of law," or that it is
not implied in the principle that every man judicially adjudged against shall have "his day in court".
And Lazarus listeneth intently and spake: "He speaketh much
gobbledygook, and he mentions not the Book of Constitutions."
And the black-robed Judge riseth in his judicial seat and rebuked Lazarus, saying: "Talk not to me of gobbledy gook. Thou
speakest in another century. It is demanded of thee this hour.
how answereth thou, guilty or not guilty."
And Lazarus spake: "They whittle away at the rights of man.
The Book of Constitutions saith that in cases criminal thou shalt
not be called to be a witness against thyself. Wilt thou rule, then,
that if the worthy City Prosecutor calls me to the stand, by the
rule I must answer?"
And the Judge replieth: "The illustrious justices have spoken
not on this matter. I will require thee, if called, to state thy name,
and permit thee to claim thy privilege."
And it came to pass that with this saying the face of Lazarus
lighted up with joy, and he exclaimeth further: "Thou hast a kind
and kindred soul, Your Honor, but thou followest not the Rules
of Civil Procedure. The action is proclaimed civil, as thou hast
said."
Whereupon the Judge instructeth Lazarus more perfectly on
this wise: "The Court Supreme hath many times stated that violation of a Municipal Ordinance although civil is also in the nature
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of a quasi-criminal proceeding. In Green v. Denver, 111 Colo. 390,
the learned Justice Jackson pronounceth as follows, even though
prosecution for the offense may be in the nature of a civil action,
the imposing of a penalty under a muncipal ordinance has the same
purpose as the imposition of a penalty under the criminal law."
And with impatience Lazarus remarketh: "It is civil when the
wind bloweth east and criminal when the wind bloweth west; how
be it in a cyclone? And if it should come to pass that the City
Prosecutor with much zeal presenteth his case and this unfortunate defendant standeth convicted before the Honorable Court,
hath he no recourse to the echelons judicial?"
And the Jurist spoke with knowledge: "Thou canst appeal to
the Court of Superiority."
Whereupon Lazarus inquireth: "And if this lowly defendant
convince you most worshipful and judicial self of his innocence,
canst the City Prosecutor hie him before the tribunal higher and
make him a second time answer to the process?"
And the Justice Pilate knowingly replieth: "This he cannot
do, for it was so passed by the Body Legislature in the Session
Laws of '53."
And the defendant commenteth wearily: "And so the law
travelleth to the side criminal. And in the Court of Superiority,
is there provided for the trial by jury, or doth the review consist
of the record not recorded? How be it, 0 Magistrate? I am without knowledge, and slow to learn."
And the Judge, perceiving the dilemma of the lowly defendant, replieth to him with compassion: "In the Court of higher
judicial authority there is preserved to thee the right to trial by
jury. Thou wilt be granted a trial de novo, just as if thou hadst
never been tried before this tribunal."
And Lazarus gravely remarketh: "They spend much of the
people's money and give a fancy name to twice try an accused.
And if thy servant desireth to climb the ladder judicial, and being
without monies or property to place security, how sayest the law,
is he deprived the right of appeal because he is poor ?"
And the Judge, by this time being already much wearied of
such questioning, answereth: "In the days of old such was the
practice, but it came to pass that on a certain day a poor defendant
with children eleven found himself in such plight, and threw himself on the mercy of the Court of Superiority, and prayed that Ble
be allowed his appeal without the posting of bond. And the Judge,
having mercy on that much burdened and overworked defendant
did permit him to so appeal. And the good legislature looketh down
across the commons and saith: 'These things should not be,' and
therefore it verily changeth the law in the year of our Lord 1955."
And Lazarus spake unto the Judge on this wise: "It is good."
But being in a quandry, inquireth further: "How wilt thou say,
0 Judge. If I prevail not here and take my cause to the tribunal
higher, and impanel a jury, doth the law permit the wind criminal
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to blow over the trial so that if I be guilty and confess my sins to
the jury and appeal to their passions, doth the law permit the
talismen to exercise their compassions and return a verdict of not
guilty as is the wont in cases criminal ?"
And the Judge answereth the defendant: "Lazarus, thou art
learned in the ways of the world, but the law worketh not thus.
As it is written in Lloyd v. Canon City, 46 Colo. 195, that the
cause being civil, the Court hath the power to a verdict direct on
a confession given."
And Lazarus respondeth: "Thou hast verily stated, 'The law
giveth and the law taketh away.' Thou art learned and wise in
the law, distinguished and esteemed Judge. I pray thee, wilt thou
explain to thy humble servant how can this be, and yet be denominated by the high justices as criminal on the quasi-extremity. Thou
art learned and wise and thou art the Judge. How sayest thee
thus ?"
And the Judge commandeth: "I am the Judge, how pleadeth
thee, guilty or not guilty ?"
Whereupon the defendant further emploreth the noble Court:
"Of personal liberty the civil law worketh not the severity as in
the criminal law. I see many of the clients of the lawyers criminal
walk free in the market place, breathing the air in and out. If
this poor subject be convicted, wilt thou permit him the right of
probation ?"
And the Court answereth Lazarus: "Lazarus, thou art searching, but it is not so provided. If thou wert convicted of a crime,
probation thou mightest have, but not so in the Courts Municipal.
If sentenced there, thou wilt be hied to the dungeon."
And despairingly Lazarus cried out: "The wind changeth."
And the Judge commandeth: "Lazarus, my patience thou hast
expended. I hereby demand of thee, guilty or not guilty?"
And thereupon Lazarus spake unto the Judge: "Most worshipful justice, I pray thee, it is provided in the Book of Statutes that
if a defendant criminal be fined for his wrong doing and he be
a pauper and without means, upon the filing of an affidavit proper
he may be relieved. What sayest this proceeding? Wilt thou give
the same right to a violator of the by-law ordinance-the civil
action?"
And Justice Pilate, with finality spake: "0 unfortunate defendant, I make not the law. I interpret and administer the statutes. Abide by them I must, lest I be stricken down with castigation
by the great justices. I adjure thee upon the penalty of contempt,
thou must reply, guilty or not guilty ?"
And Lazarus crieth out, "Thou requireth me to answer to a
mutation, an incongruity, a hybrid. It is neither fish nor fowl. Honest.ly Judge, I answer nil debet."

